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Preface 
 
When looking closely at Middle East oil industry what puzzled me most was 
the attention conveyed to oil price formation through profit sharing agreements 
hammered out between big multinationals and national governments. For sure, 
this was a noticeable event sequence marked by purposeful intentions and 
achievements, involving conflicting actors assisted by global geo-strategical 
forces. Debates, negotiations, and disputes left a persuasive track record in 
petroleum history.   However, state-companies’ compromises do not explain 
how the Middle East became a new geographical basepoint for petroleum 
transactions and the hub of the global pricing system. Something else must 
have happened that changed the oil pricing system. It is this silent and 
uncharted side of the story that this book addresses. 
Overall, the ensuing pages constitute an extended version of the article entitled 
“Squabbling Sisters: Multinational Companies and Middle East Oil Prices“, 
published in Business History Review, 2017 (91) 4, pages 681-706. I gratefully 
acknowledge the Luso-American Development Foundation (FLAD) research 
grant, the insightful comments made by three anonymous referees and BHR 
editorial team, as well as for Editorial Académica Española support. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In October 1950, the first posting of Middle East crude prices went almost 
unnoticed by the western media. In the United States, only the more attentive 
readers of the New York Journal of Commerce, along with the key managers 
of industrial and financial institutions enrolled in corporate mailing lists, would 
have noticed the emergence of this new petroleum trading market. 
Nonetheless, this event constituted a historical turning point given it 
established a new geographical basepoint for petroleum transactions. 
Alongside the global benchmark set by the daily quotations for Mexican Gulf 
and Caribbean crude, businessmen and companies now had access to an 
alternative official trading spot, located some 10,000 nautical miles away in the 
Persian Gulf, at the heart of the Arabian Peninsula. The global commodity of 
petroleum henceforth revolved around two axes, one located in the Western 
hemisphere and the other in the Eastern hemisphere. But just how were these 
markets interconnected? The ensuing pages explain how the Middle East 
became a new geographical basepoint for petroleum transactions and the hub 
of the global pricing system. 
 The sudden discovery of several Middle East giant oilfields (1943-1947) along 
with the disclosure of the region’s reserves potential, turned the global pricing 
equilibrium harder to sustain. US oil multinationals were key actors in this 
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process. They faced an extreme divide between their foreign and internal 
situations: first, new business opportunities emerged because of the discovery 
of huge reserves with low extraction costs; second, an adverse political 
environment of public outcry against big business and cartel practices was 
fuelled by the media, the US Department of Justice, the Congress, and sectors 
of the US Federal Government. The outcome of this process was the release 
of a report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1952, in which major 
companies were indicted for cartel practices1. 
This FTC report provided a good account of collusive mechanisms based upon 
the interlacing of interests: the joint ownership of concession rights shaped a 
web of common property rights in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and, later 
on, in Iran and Abu Dhabi. These rights were reinforced by joint ownership of 
stock facilities, refineries, and pipelines. In addition, these interests became 
even more closely interwoven through the execution of long-term contracts for 
the sale of crude oil2. Seven multinational companies took hold of the oil 
resources through the control of upstream operations (from exploration to 
                                                            
1
  B. I. Kaufman, “Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel Case and the Cold War,” The Business History 
Review 51, No. 1 (1977):35-56; United States policies with respect to petroleum, Foreign Relations 
of the United States (FRUS), 1951, (Washington, 1986), Vol.1,966-992. 
2
 Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, released through the Subcommittee on Monopoly 
of the Select Committee on Small Business, The International Petroleum Cartel, U.S. Senate, 83rd 
Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC, 1952), 37-58. 
  
 
7 
 
extraction) and held significant sway over the downstream activities (from 
refining to distribution). 
Several authors have remarked on how there was little need to formalize secret 
paper agreements to limit competition and uphold prices when the very 
productive structure fostered the natural convergence of shared common 
assumptions about prices and the rate at which the industry should expand3. 
Wayne Leeman, for instance, claimed that the appropriate classification for the 
seven multinational companies should be ‘natural oligopoly’4. Competition was 
naturally circumvented because there were such large economies of scale in 
finding, producing, refining and distributing oil. Only a few firms with optimum 
scales could supply the financial sums demanded5. Edith Penrose furthermore 
noted the role of vertical and horizontal linkages as preventive barriers to entry 
as these precluded the accumulation of large amounts of crude in the hands of 
sellers6.  
                                                            
3
 Wayne Leeman, The price of Middle East oil: an essay in political economy, (Ithaca-N. York, 1962), 
John Blair, The Control of Oil. (New York, 1976). 
4
 Leeman, The price of Middle East oil, 56-62. 
5
  Jahangir Amuzegar, Managing oil wealth: OPEC’s windfalls and pitfalls (New York,  2001), 12-
13; Leeman, The price of Middle East oil. 
6
  E. Penrose, (1968), The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International 
Petroleum Industry, (Cambridge-MA, 1968), 182-193. 
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Anthony Sampson’s book, The Seven Sisters, published in 1975, cleared the 
path for a turnaround. The catchword title was taken from a declaration made 
some years before by Enrico Mattei, an independent cartel dissenter from the 
Italian oil company Ente Nazional-ENI. Sampson felt that ‘oligopoly’ simply 
represented too weak a concept to account for the sheer might secured by oil 
multinationals. He claimed that much more was at stake than mere 
interdependence and market control. The fate of each oil major was linked with 
its peers because the fortunes of each impacted upon the fortunes of the 
others. Hence, their relative positioning proved similar to the economic and 
social links nurtured by family ties. More than independent juridical entities 
acting in tacit collusion, each oil major actually resembled a fraternity of sisters: 
‘the seven sisters’. This multinational fraternity was less committed to keeping 
prices high than it was to keeping prices down by holding a steady front against 
the claims of producer nations: if the multinationals acted as a cartel their 
‘principal purpose was to screw the producers’7. Oil majors were thus expected 
to close ranks not so much against consumer interests as against Arab nations 
who were the owners of the natural resources.  
Despite the overarching influence of Sampson’s book, not everybody agreed 
with his viewpoint. Some authors still held that the primary goal of 
multinationals involved limiting upstream competition, balancing demand and 
                                                            
7
 Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters (New York, 1975), 174. 
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supply, and boosting profits. As classical cartel theory underlines, profits are 
maximized by jointly restricting output and increasing prices, ideally to that set 
by a monopolist8. Drawing on this line of inquiry, Edith Penrose and Francisco 
Parra have shown how the offtake agreements hammered out by the big oil 
companies actually worked as a mechanism for restricting production9. As long 
as these agreements handed down explicit rules—written, signed and kept 
secret (as in Saudi Arabia and Iran)—they closely resembled the 
documentation trails hidden from legal authorities by hard-core cartels. For this 
reason, Parra labels the seven sisters a quasi-cartel10. 
Under the vertically and horizontally integrated concession system, oil trading, 
to a large extent, became a question of inter-company exchanges with most 
transactions made within the scope of company controls11. In contrast to these 
internalized (transfer) prices were the posted prices, in which selling 
companies made public the dollar value they were prepared to accept in 
                                                            
8
 Morris Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore: 1972), 87-88. 
9
 Penrose, The Large International Firm; Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of 
Petroleum (New York, 2004). 
10
 Parra, Oil Politics, 4, 67. 
11
 Robert Mabro, On Oil Price Concepts, WPM3, Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (Oxford, 
1984); Bassam Fattouh, “The Origins and Evolution of the Current International Oil Pricing System,” 
in Oil in the 21st Century, ed. Robert Mabro (Oxford, 2006), 41-100. 
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exchange for a barrel of crude oil. Later, posted prices served above all as a 
fiscal parameter12.  
The study examines the historical emergence of the Middle East oil pricing 
system from an ‘inside-out’ perspective13. In this respect, the inter-continental 
cost asymmetry that surfaced after World War II, along with the Arab oil-boom, 
set incentives for the formulation of independent pricing strategies. There was 
also an environment that eased the disclosure of private practices.  It is worth 
remembering that the dawn of the Middle East petroleum industry (1947–1951) 
coincided with the Marshall Plan audit (an American initiative to financially 
assist Western Europe after the war) through the assignment of orders to 
supply the deprived European nations. David Painter’s14 analysis has shown 
that the procurement of petroleum and petroleum products from ‘offshores 
sources’, under the European Recovery Program, revealed divergences and 
inconsistencies in the pricing schemes of the various companies. Long-term 
                                                            
12
 Robert Mabro,” The International Oil Price Regime. Origins, Rationale and Assessment”, The 
Journal of Energy Literature XI, No. 1 (2005): 3-20 quotation on 4.  
13
  . Espen Storli,” Cartel Theory and Cartel Practice: The Case of the International Aluminum Cartels, 
1901–1940,” Business History Review, 88 No. 3 (2014): 445 – 467 
14
  David S. Painter, “Oil and the Marshall Plan, “The Business History Review, 58, No. 3 (1984): 
359-383; David S. Painter, “The Marshall Plan and Oil”, Cold War History 9, No. 2 (2009): 159-175; 
David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 
1941-1954 (Baltimore, 1986). 
  
 
11 
 
contract prices, transfer prices, and official prices were placed under the 
scrutiny of the authorities. The act of external regulation impacted on the 
relationships among those experiencing supervision, as so often proves the 
case.  
 
Global Players and the Middle East 
 
 
Considering the seven multinational firms, we may differentiate between the 
historical hub, formed by the largest enterprises that first seized a share of the 
global market in the 19th century, and the second generation of national 
companies that evolved towards the multinational stage after World War I 
moving gradually into full international expansion. While Jersey Standard-
Exxon and Royal Dutch-Shell belong to the historical hub, Anglo-Iranian-BP, 
Socony-Mobil, Gulf Oil, Texaco and Standard of California-Chevron fall into the 
latter group of 20th century latecomers.  
Table 1 depicts the market share for crude extraction and refining in 1947 with 
the two historical companies, which were clearly ahead of the others. The 
striking point, however, was the difference between the thresholds to 
globalization. Incumbent market leaders, such as Jersey-Exxon and Royal 
Dutch-Shell, displayed a strong presence not only in the US but also in other 
regions, including Indonesia, Romania, Austria, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, 
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Canada and the Middle East (not to mention their former stakes in Russia and 
Mexico wiped out by nationalizations). However, the other companies, with the 
partial exception of Gulf Oil, operated mainly in the Arab and Persian regions, 
or in the US and Arab regions. In terms of market heterogeneity, the key fissure 
thereby divides the historical companies, forced to streamline supply from 
different sources and pursue a global pricing strategy, and the group of 
latecomers, whose supply and pricing strategies had to be Middle East 
centered. 
There are two important issues. First, the huge quantities of oil produced in the 
US were primarily absorbed by its internal market as North America no longer 
produced a petroleum surplus to feed world markets. Second, the historical 
companies (plus Gulf Oil), with their production scattered worldwide, returned 
the highest export surpluses from the rich oilfields of Lake Maracaibo, 
Venezuela (Table 1, Other regions column / Jersey-Exxon, Royal Dutch-Shell, 
Gulf Oil). This important pool, explored in close cooperation and explicit 
collusion, was interconnected with the giant refineries and terminals located on 
the Caribbean islands of Curacao (Shell) and Aruba (Jersey).   
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Table 1 
Crude oil production under control of the seven sisters and their respective 
refining capacities in 1947 
Oil 
Company 
 Crude oil production under corporate control* Refining 
capacity* 
   
US 
 
 
 
(1) 
Middle 
East 
 
 
 
(2) 
Other 
regions 
 
 
 
(3) 
Total 
crude oil 
producti
on 
 
(4) = 
1+2+3 
Percent
age of 
world 
producti
on 
  
(5) 
Refining 
capacity 
 
 
 
(6) 
Crude 
oil 
producti
on / 
refining 
capacity 
(7) = 4/6 
Anglo-Iranian / BP 0 399.4 66.1 465.5 5.6 489 0.95 
Standard Oil 
California / Chevron 
263.1 100.1 35.4 398.6 4.8 327 1.22 
Texas Co  289.4 100.1 44.1 433.6 5.2 492 0.88 
Standard Oil New 
Jersey / Exxon 
465 95.2 640.3 1200.5 14.5 1348 0.89 
Socony / Mobil 172 34.2 29.3 235.5 2.8 560 0.42 
Royal Dutch-Shell 195.5 6.5 444.5 646.5 7.8 917 0.71 
Gulf Oil  216.1 70.0 102.6 388.7 4.7 360 1.08 
*in thousand barrels per day 
Sources: Estimates based on National Archives – Washington (NARA], ECA, Preliminary 
Report of Prices paid in ECA-financed petroleum transactions, 24 October 1949, Record of 
the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Arab Oil Litigation #43; DeGolyer and MacNaughton. 
Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics. Dallas: DeGolyer and MacNaughton, 2005. 
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The greater the depth of corporate separation between historic (Western 
hemisphere) surplus exporters and latecomer (Eastern hemisphere) surplus 
exporters, the greater the risk of plain price competition. Given the differences 
in extraction costs, the long-term result could be advantageous to the latter 
group only. Nevertheless, market heterogeneity may serve to identify potential 
fault lines among the seven sisters but not how these lines came about in 
practice. The potential clash between the vintage and the latecomer 
multinationals was offset by the robust interlacing of interests. An analysis of 
the concession rights, long-term contracts, joint marketing organizations and 
petroleum exchange arrangements will reveal how Socony-Mobil assets 
appeared closely tied up with those of Jersey-Exxon in the same way that 
Royal Dutch-Shell’s interests proved closely interrelated to those of Anglo-
Iranian-BP15. Such close-knit relationships fundamentally resulted from 
attempts to broaden the pattern of vertical integration globally by joining forces 
in international marketing and distribution16. The American companies, Jersey-
Socony and the European Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Iranian-BP, pooled 
their resources with the intent to extend the geographical range of retail outlets 
                                                            
15
  Leeman, The price of Middle East oil, 15-38; Penrose, The Large International Firm; J.H. 
Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company. The Anglo-Iranian years, 1928-1954 
(Cambridge, 1994), Vol.2, 277-307. 
16
 A. D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge-
MA, 1977), 352-353. 
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and size-premium gasoline markets. This revealed the quasi-cartel dynamics. 
When market heterogeneity and interlocking affinities are equally taken into 
consideration, the distinction becomes that between the solid nucleus (formed 
by the above-mentioned four majors) and the detached fringe: Texaco, 
Standard of California-Chevron and Gulf Oil. 
Overall, the statistics displayed in Table 1 portray a transition stage in the 
Middle East. Bold plans designed by imperial powers to take hold of resources 
and exert significant leverage upon local governments proved hard to apply in 
the field. After 1946, Moscow was compelled to relinquish its claims over 
Northern Iran, while London had to recognise that it could no longer oversee 
the whole region owing to financial and logistical shortcomings17. Washington, 
on the other hand, stepped in as the events unfolded, moving quickly to fill the 
power vacuum. The peculiar project to acquire a control interest over the 
Middle East oil business envisioned by the Department of the Interior was 
however discarded18. According to the precautionary guidelines set down by 
                                                            
17
  O. Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin 
to Khrushchev (Cambridge, 2014); Paul W. T. Kingston, Britain and the Politics of Modernization in 
the Middle East, 1945-1958 (Cambridge, 1996). 
18
  Irvine H. Anderson. Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of 
Foreign Oil Policy, 1922–1950 (Princeton, 1981); A Documentary history of the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation, 1943-1944 Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate (Washington, 1974). 
  
 
16 
 
US President Harry Truman, Middle East foreign policy should streamline three 
priorities: (i) provide assistance and aid; (ii) install overseas military bases; and 
(iii) promote economic development through private American oil businesses19. 
The latter point implied that prosperous oil exploration was vital in deepening 
the drive for modernizing and strengthening existing regimes. As a 
consequence, American foreign policy became entangled with the outlook of 
US multinationals. It felt to the government to protect the long term interests of 
US oil business20 and to the companies to secure a stream of revenues for 
Arab and Persian governments by the means of concession rights, royalty rates 
and the payment of other taxes. Similar to the post-war strategy pursued in 
Europe and Japan, economic growth was supposed to bolster strong 
governments and raise a curtain of development to offset the Soviet Union’s 
iron curtain. 
                                                            
19
 Toru Ozonawa, “Formation of American Regional Policy for the Middle East, 1950–1952: The 
Middle East Command Concept and Its Legacy”, Diplomatic History 29, No 1 (2005): 117–148; 
Edward W. Chester. United States oil policy and diplomacy: a twentieth century overview. (Westport, 
Connecticut: 1983), 230-252; Interests of the U.S. in questions of Economic and Military assistance 
to Saudi Arabia, FRUS, 1950, Volume V, The Near East and Saudi Arabia,1112- 1200.  
20
  Meetings of U.S. Committees and correspondence Paul G. Hoffman to Walter Levy, 14 March 
1949, University of Wyoming-American Heritage Center (UW-AHC), Walter J. Lewis papers, Box 21, 
file 5.  I would like to express my deepest thanks to David Painter for the access to this 
documentation. 
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Diplomatically, the redesign of the oil economy required the end of the 
restrictive Red Line Agreement of 1928, which was designed to protect 
undercapitalized firms from companies with financial muscle21. An international 
bidding rule was at stake, which limited each participant in a conjoint oil pool 
from searching new reservoirs outside the legal boundaries of their 
concessions. The context of post-war expansion rendered the Agreement an 
unbearable burden, particularly for the integrated multinational firms with 
ambitious plans but with low levels of self-production. With the abolition of the 
Red Line Agreement, the companies were finally free to invest in the production 
and refining of crude in Anatolia, Turkey, the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, 
Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Kurdistan. In corporate terms, the post-war 
changeover involved further access by historical majors to low-cost Arab oil, 
enhancing the stakes of Jersey Standard-Exxon, Socony-Mobil and Royal 
Dutch-Shell in Middle East petroleum surplus. Thanks to inter-company 
contracts, a new equilibrium came into effect among crude-long multinationals, 
with spare oil for the existing retail outlets, and crude-short multionationals, with 
scarce reserves for their own distribution networks. 
Ultimately, the diplomatic and corporate bargaining process realigned the 
share of Middle East oil taken by the central multinationals. Jersey Standard-
                                                            
21
 G.P. Nowell, Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel, 1900-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), 186-
187. 
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Exxon acquired reserves of 291,500 barrels (bbl)/day (a long-term supply 
contract with Anglo-Iranian-BP), 52,000 bbl/day (firm offtake from a joint 
concession with Saudi Arabia) and 10,000 bbl/day (a medium term exchange 
contract for Indonesian Seria crude agreed with Standard of California); 
Socony-Mobil acquired reserves of 73,000 bbl/day (a long-term supply contract 
with Anglo-Iranian-BP) and 24,200 bbl/day (firm offtake from a joint concession 
with Saudi Arabia); and Royal Dutch Shell secured the acquisition of 275,000 
bbl/day (a long-term supply contract with Gulf Oil)22.  
As shown in Table 1, these figures provide a contextualized idea of ongoing 
changes. In a short time span, the marked imbalance between the foremost 
Western/Eastern hemisphere corporations reduced, which reinforced 
cooperation and strengthened common interests. Although the threat of open 
competition was largely reduced, the difference in interests still persisted within 
the quasi-cartel environment. Despite Jersey Standard-Exxon and Royal 
                                                            
22
 Aramco crude price study, July 17, 1947, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Hearings before the subcommittee on multinational corporations. (MCUSFP-HBSMC) (Washington 
1975), vol. 8,  196-205; Principal Agreement between the Shell Petroleum Company Limited and 
Standard Oil Company of California 14 December 1950, National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, Md. [NARA], Record of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies 
(RUSFAA), Arab Oil Litigation #42, Freight Documents from Caltex; Letter from the Secretary of 
State to the embassy in the United Kingdom, 20 August 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, Economic and 
Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2, 284-285. 
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Dutch-Shell’s reinforcement of their Middle East positions, their main source of 
supply to Europe and the US continued to be in the Caribbean: in 1948, the 
total petroleum obtained by different means in the Arabian and Persian oilfields 
accounted for just 65% and 70% of Jersey Standard-Exxon and Royal Dutch-
Shell production in Venezuela, respectively23. Consequently, Maracaibo heavy 
oil had to withstand export market competition from the Arabian Gulf light 
crudes marketed by the fellow sisters. In contrast, the new acquisitions, long-
term contracts, and concession-sharing agreements did not resolve the overall 
problem of petroleum shortages, which materialized in persistent deficits 
between own production and refinery capacity (Table 1, column 7). For 
decades, Jersey Standard-Exxon remained crude-short and Royal Dutch Shell 
crude-hungry; both were heavily reliant on buying crude from third parties and 
paid a supplementary cost and a trading premium over the competitive transfer 
price of Middle East oil24. 
In summary, the historical multinationals stood to gain considerably from an 
international pricing system based on prices set to equalize costs at the 
destination. Such prices would return extra profits for low-cost regions while 
                                                            
23
 American Embassy Caracas, Annual Report Petroleum Venezuela, 10 March 1949, [NARA], 
RUSFAA, Deputy Director for Management #NDD 917756, oil pricing 1948-54, Box 1. 
24
 Stephen Howarth and Joost Jonker, Powering the Hydrocarbon Revolution, 1939-1973. A History 
of Royal Dutch Shell (Oxford, 2007), Vol. 2; Bennett H. Wall, Growth in a Changing Environment: a 
History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 1950-1975 (New York, 1988) Volume 4. 
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defending the investments already made in countries with mature oilfields. 
However, the competition also depended on the costs of getting crude oil from 
the wells to the refineries and the centres of consumption. In reality, this proved 
to be the crux of the matter, as shown in the last section. 
 
Regional and Global Prices 
 
By 1945, the international oil pricing system was crumbling. For a brief period, 
competition and decentralized exchange prevailed over the economies of 
integrated multinationals and their organizational hierarchies. In the Persian 
Gulf, an Anglo-Iranian-BP manager reported that prices were beginning to get 
settled on an ‘ad-hoc basis’. The practice was for ‘buyers and sellers to 
negotiate a price based upon their individual assessments of competitive parity 
with crude oils in the Mexican Gulf’, which naturally resulted in a series of 
different prices’25. American sources reiterated the same point in stressing the 
drift of Arab Gulf prices26. Not only was there a revival in short-term 
transactions, but also the same quality crude was being sold for different values 
over short periods.  
                                                            
25
 W.D. Brown, Course of the Middle East Oil Prices, 15 April 1959, British Petroleum Archives – 
Warwick- UK [BPA], History of BP- subject prices, file 115920. 
26
 William J. Hull, History of ECA Pricing Policy, 25 July 1950, 8, [NARA], RUSFAA, Arab Oil Litigation 
#43 Freight documents, Box 1. 
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The immediate post-war events marked a departure from the preceding Gulf-
Plus cartel system. As the title suggests, Gulf-Plus was a benchmark for 
worldwide transactions based on published quotations from Texas oilfields 
‘plus’ the respective transport costs from the Mexican Gulf. Emerging at a time 
when American crude supplied the world27, this single basing point presumed 
the calculation of transport costs as if all oil had come from the Mexican Gulf 
alongside the acceptance of Texas wellhead prices as the universal yardstick. 
In practical terms, the buyer paid the same delivered price for oil irrespective 
of the shipping port of origin: from wherever the crude had been extracted, the 
delivered price was always determined by the Gulf-Texas gauge. Any possible 
competition, whether between oil regions or between companies, was 
eradicated by this means. 
The foundations of Gulf-Plus—standardized oil prices and fictitious transport 
costs—began to fade away during World War II. The system’s erosion was 
caused by the cumulative effect of five independent factors: (i) the weakening 
of the Achacarry cartel rules28; (ii) the re-routing of tankers due to submarine 
                                                            
27
  Helmut J. Frank, Crude oil prices in the Middle East. A study in oligopolistic price behavior, (New 
York-London, 1966), 10-12. 
28
 Ranvir Singh Kanwar, (States, firms, and oil: British policy, 1939-54. PhD thesis (Coventry, 
University of Warwick, 2000), 121-124; 142-152.  Daniel Yergin, The Prize (New York 1991), 266-
268. 
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and naval warfare29; (iii) opportunistic Middle East sales with discounts that 
deviated significantly from Gulf-Plus30; (iv) the establishment of a new basing 
point in the Persian Gulf for bunker oil31; and (v) close cooperation and 
supervision between government agencies and petroleum businesses32. Most 
of these exceptional events resulted from the context of war. However, 
afterwards, there was to be no return to ‘normality’. Competitive markets, non-
parallel pricing and ‘ad-hoc’ transactions went hand in hand with the corporate 
oil economy assured by internal asset transfers undertaken between 
multinationals and their affiliates.  
Although the ‘plus’ of the Gulf-Plus system (i.e. the fictitious input of a transport 
cost) faded away, some linkages between Middle East oil and US-Texas prices 
stubbornly persisted. For instance, some contracts signed in 1946 and 1947 
contained a clause prescribing that the price paid for delivered oil should not 
                                                            
29
  Kanwar, (2000) States, firms, and oil, 114 -121. 
30
  Frank, Crude oil prices in the Middle East, 18-19. 
31
  The International Petroleum Cartel, Staff Report, 355-356. 
32
  Michael B. Stoff, “The Anglo-American Oil Agreement and the Wartime Search for Foreign Oil 
Policy,” The Business History Review 55, No. 1 (1981): 59-74; Edward W. Chester, United States 
Oil Policy and Diplomacy: Kanwar, States, firms, and oil. 
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exceed the price in effect for the equivalent US crude33. When prices began to 
rise in America, another indexing clause ensured that Middle East contract 
prices should move in line with future Texas prices34, thus allowing for short-
term adjustments. However, as long as each company was free to set its own 
independent dollar value for the delivered crude, the North American yardstick 
became just a relative orientation. Even in cases where contracts accepted the 
absolute benchmark of Gulf of Mexico–Texas prices as often happened with 
Anglo-Iranian-BP contractual arrangements35, the freight charges were 
estimated on a real-travel basis, rather than as fictitious distance costs, which 
opened the way for charging different prices at different destinations. 
Out of this singular context grew a fresh reflection on pricing. The point 
stemmed from the negotiations for the admission of Jersey Standard-Exxon 
and Socony-Mobil into the Saudi Arabian concession. A general agreement 
stipulated the division of the stock in the joint exploration subsidiary, Aramco, 
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into 30% shares allocated to both of the initial stockholders, Standard of 
California-Chevron and Texaco, plus 30% to Jersey Standard-Exxon and 10% 
to Socony-Mobil, the new stockholders. In the second quarter of 1947, the 
debate took a new turn and centred on finding a mutually satisfactory price for 
Aramco crude. 
In starkest terms, the discussion revolved around the price that each partner 
should pay for the offtake crude acquired in proportion with the respective 
capital stock in Aramco. Under such circumstances, it was no wonder that the 
minority shareholders, with constraints on their initial offtakes (e.g. Jersey 
Standard-Exxon and Socony-Mobil), would rationally bet on the proposed 
upper band to squeeze the maximum profit out of total sales36. However, 
strategic interests beyond those short-term objectives impaired the talks and 
resulted in entrenched positions. The clash was shortened by the proposition 
of two pricing formulas: cost-plus and netback price. 
Standard of California-Chevron and Texaco, grouped into the Caltex joint 
venture to heighten the common interest in Aramco exports, supported the 
advantages of a cost-plus formula. Cost included the expense of operations, 
royalties, the cash required for working capital, capital investments, taxes and 
payments, dividends to stakeholders, and exceptional expenditures incurred 
by the Saudi Arabian government. Therefore, Caltex recommended the price 
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of $1.02/bbl for Arabian crude—a value that heightened the sales in expanding 
markets and that could undercut competition from the other companies in 
Europe while simultaneously ‘permitting shipments to the USA without loss 
against competition from South America’37. Hence, if $1.02/bbl ensured a very 
competitive price throughout the Eastern hemisphere,38 it was because the 
price was designed to compete with production costs in more distant markets: 
it reached North America and swept Europe. 
The standpoints of Jersey Standard-Exxon and Socony-Mobil varied sharply. 
Far-reaching competitive prices could only push Saudi Arabian oil into 
competing with their Venezuelan subsidiaries in Western hemisphere markets, 
hurting the companies’ outlets. As stated by its opponents, ‘Jersey is 
undoubtedly interested in continuing to move products to Europe from the 
Caribbean.’39 An earmarked and non-competitive price for Saudi oil was 
needed in the sense of (i) only attaining markets in the nearby area of the 
Mediterranean (a high crude price could cope with short distance travel costs) 
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and (ii) enabling moderate market share growth. The proper manner of having 
this both ways was to devise a target price defined at the destination rather 
than the origin. Jersey Standard-Exxon and Socony-Mobil suggested the dollar 
value of approximately $1.48/bbl designed to match the price of similar quality 
crude from Venezuela (Jusepin) delivered to the South of France40. In this 
manner, French consumers received the same price but from different 
geographical sources. More importantly, the Arabian crude price was set to 
equalize the incumbent competitor at the place of destination. To arrive at the 
estimate of $1.48/bbl for Saudi Arabian light crude entailed summing the price 
of Maracaibo crude in Venezuela with the travel costs to the final destination 
(in this case Maracaibo-Bordeaux) and then subtracting the transport costs 
from Saudi Arabia (Ras Tanura) to Bordeaux. The final result expressed the 
netback price of Arabian crude in relation to the Southern Mediterranean. It 
ascertained how crude oil should be priced free on board (fob) at the Saudi 
shipping port of Ras Tanura in order to equalize the customs, insurance, and 
freight (cif) price of Venezuelan crude at the Bordeaux destination. As a mirror-
price, the netback reflected the difference in transportation and production 
costs for a benchmark commodity. The formula couched the encirclement of 
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the Arabian competitive boundary within the Mediterranean, leaving the more 
distant North European markets to alternative (Caribbean) suppliers.  
At the critical juncture of 1947, the choices were clear: Aramco could opt for 
either a cost-plus regional price (totally independent of the Gulf of Mexico and 
Caribbean quotations) or a global price calibrated by the costs of the other 
exporting regions. As long as Caribbean prices remained indexed to US-
Mexican Gulf prices, the netback method would pave the way for a return to a 
global petroleum pricing system that once again revolved around the Western 
hemisphere. In contrast, the acceptance of the cost-plus formula would 
contribute to cementing an independent basing point for transactions in the 
Middle East. 
The fringe multinationals grouped in Caltex (Standard of California-Chevron 
and Texaco), which are dependent upon the Saudi concession for building and 
consolidating a distribution network, strove for a competitive cost-plus pricing 
strategy relatively independent of world prices. In contrast, the core sisters, 
Jersey Standard-Exxon and Socony-Mobil, attempted to preserve the 
equilibrium that was fairly attained and to defend world price stability through 
netback equalizing formulas interlinked with the global yardstick of Gulf of 
Mexico prices. As avowed by a Socony executive director, a higher Saudi price 
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could ‘lead to the stabilization of the world price by preventing oil from being 
offered on the market’41.  
In the end, the Aramco Committee decided against Jersey Standard-Exxon 
and Socony-Mobil. With the victory of the cost-plus formula, Arabian crude was 
bought by shareholding companies towards the lower limit of the price range: 
$1.02/bbl. The outcome represented a green light for the expansion plans of 
Caltex in Europe42 and a potential breach in the collusion around non-
competitive prices.  
However, this corporate separation was partially circumvented. Surprisingly, a 
win–win solution was devised, which led to the compromise of a double-pricing 
system: while Aramco’s transfer sales to multinational subsidiaries continued 
to be carried on a cost-plus basis, their official sales to non-subsidiaries started 
being held on a netback basis.   
Taking advantage of a steady increase in oil prices, which spread from Texas 
to the Middle East during the second half of 1947, Aramco kept the low price 
for offtake crude acquired by shareholders, but raised the official market price 
in line with other competitors. By the close of that year, the gap between 
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transfer prices and market prices had widened to such an extent that a clear-
cut double-pricing policy had come into effect: Caltex and Socony-Mobil sold 
their stocks of Arabian crude at $1.29/bbl and sometimes $1.57/bbl while the 
subsidiary Aramco had moved steadfastly to the upper plateau of the market 
at $2.22/bbl, which was also the running price for the Anglo-Iranian-BP 
competitor43. Overall, there was one concessionary company with four 
shareholders and two prices: the official price recognized by the oil business 
community, and the private transfer price (kept secret between the 
shareholders and their affiliates), which allowed for more competitive sales.  
The massive investments required to build a new pipeline to the Mediterranean 
and the expansion of local refinery facilities pressed Aramco to raise the 
transfer price to $1.30/bbl (January 1948) and $1.43/bbl (June 1948)—a value 
deemed to be ‘a fair measure of the market value of Arabian crude at Ras 
Tanura for import into the United States’44. By this time, the official price of 
Saudi light crude had fallen back to $2.03/bbl due to the Caltex initiative (May 
1948)45. 
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Netback Prices and the Marshall Plan 
 
Between April 1948 and December 1951, millions of tons of economic aid 
arrived in Europe under the Marshall Plan. The task of economic reconstruction 
involved the extensive procurement of food, raw materials, consumer goods, 
equipment and fuels. Among the commodities dispatched, oil held the leading 
position, accounting for 10% of the total economic aid. At a time of hard 
currency shortages, the Plan provided the dollar’s that European countries 
needed and the dollar’s that US companies needed. All purchases had to 
comply with tight rules regarding contracts and pricing, plus the accounting 
controls set forth by Marshall Plan agencies and additional scrutiny exercised 
by US Senators. Such preventive supervision eased the control of undesired 
side effects of the European Recovery Program—corruption, bribery, influence 
peddling and black marketeering—and became the hallmark of the Assistance 
program46. 
Despite the straightforward legal directives established for the independent 
agency (the European Cooperation Administration - ECA), its director soon 
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realized that petroleum supply was one of the most difficult issues to solve. The 
legal framework compelled the ECA to guarantee the procurement of 
petroleum and petroleum products ‘from sources outside the United States’, at 
a price not higher ‘than the market price prevailing in the United States at the 
time of purchase’ and also not surpassing ‘the price regularly charged by the 
supplier company in comparable transactions with other customers’47. These 
guidelines raised several practical problems. From the outset, American 
companies requested relief from the uniform pricing rule that was stipulated for 
exports, stressing that they were charging ‘different prices in comparable 
transactions’48. In view of the urgent situation in Europe, the ECA’s 
management had no other option than to temporarily grant the companies a 
waiver on this requirement. The decision, however, left the ECA on a razor’s 
edge: it could not take the price set by each multinational for granted, nor could 
it act as a price setting agency and issue reference values for oil (a legal 
restraint set by Congress). Torn between accepting declared commercial 
prices and fixing prices, the Marshall Plan agency had to carve out some 
middle ground and devise new operational criteria for consistently allocating oil 
purchases.  
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In keeping with the strategy to recruit experts directly involved in specialized 
business areas49, Walter Levy was appointed and invited to come up with a 
solution. His track record of collaboration with state agencies, in particular the 
petroleum sections of the US Office of Strategic Services and the State 
Department, plus his private business experience at Socony-Mobil, made him 
a respected figure in oil-trading circles. His vision of post war development 
fostered by free-initiative, big business and private investment in the Middle 
East was strikingly at odds not only with some of the statist New Dealer visions 
but also with the strong anti-monopolistic stands that held significant sway in 
the early years of the Truman administration50. To some extent, Levy’s 
appointment as consultant was in itself a counterweight to the trustbusters and 
an attempt to resume dialogue with oil interests. At the ECA’s request, Levy 
wrote a memorandum on petroleum export prices. Delivered in May 1948, this 
document opened the way for the full-time appointment of the external 
consultant as head of the ECA petroleum department. The nomination broke 
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new ground in the search for a solution, not least because it foreclosed the 
ECA’s efforts to flatten oil prices.   
To surmount all institutional constraints, Walter Levy envisaged a double 
strategy: in the short term, the agency should streamline Marshall Plan 
procurements under the minimal rule of netback prices, thereby accepting the 
Jersey Standard-Exxon viewpoint in the debate with Caltex. The pricing 
alternative based on the cost of production was side-lined “… because it would 
lead to a variation of the landed cost of different source oil in the importing 
country, with unpredictable repercussion on the competitive position of the 
various marketers”51. Contrariwise, price equalization at the destination could 
preserve the structure of global pricing, uphold the Mexican Gulf-Caribbean 
area as the reference basepoint and guarantee sufficient returns on company 
investments. Most importantly, the netback pricing formula provided the 
necessary business latitude for determining prices, which enhanced the ECA’s 
monitoring and regulating roles. In the medium term, Walter Levy foresaw the 
danger of pricing formulas geared by monopolies, and consequently added a 
second remark calling for deeper negotiations with the companies ‘in order to 
establish a competitive price’52.  
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The criteria suited the viewpoints of the core globalized multinationals as they 
received dollars for sales to Europe (all companies except British Anglo-
Iranian-BP benefited from Marshall Plan funds). A few weeks after the 
submission of Levy’s memorandum, Eugene Holman, Jersey-Exxon’s 
president, announced to the press his commitment towards netback prices with 
Caribbean oil as the key basing point. Jersey-Exxon effectively pledged to 
ascertain the free on board (f.o.b.) Persian Gulf oil price to meet competition 
from Venezuelan oil in Northern Europe, where its main distribution centre, the 
Fawley Refinery in Southampton, Britain, was located53. The main emphasis 
was placed on disclosing the rationale behind oil prices. Holman’s statement 
underpinned Jersey-Exxon’s engagement in standardized prices, prices 
equalized with alternative sources of supply and ‘prices arrived at 
independently’54. The key purpose was to reply to the crossfire unleashed in 
the Senate and in Congress55. In all likelihood, Jersey-Exxon knew that the 
netback justification was eligible for endorsement by the Marshall Plan agency 
and, therefore, the time was ripe for a public rejoinder. Transparent prices 
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became a trump card. In fact, in the ensuing months, the ECA concurred with 
the view that Jersey-Exxon’s netback pricing formula could be ‘qualified as a 
competitive price’56. In the end, the Lewis–Holman line-up proved mutually 
beneficial: the pricing dilemma had been solved.  
Although less affected, the foreign oil companies, Anglo-Iranian/BP and Dutch 
Shell, also praised the clarification. The ‘Holman policy’ not only assured a 
return for Middle East crudes in ‘those Mediterranean markets nearer the 
Persian Gulf’57 but also stalled the globalized competition whose ‘…first effect 
would be to produce an unnatural demand from oil coming from the cheapest 
source’ so that the ‘surplus from this source would rapidly become exhausted 
… leading to wholly unstable conditions … and ultimately to the shutdown of 
all producing companies other than those with the lowest cost’58. For European 
eyes, what seemed most bizarre was the very hypothesis of a competitive tide 
sweeping across the globe. 
Caltex was much less convinced about the fairness of netback pricing. Again 
and again, the Standard of California-Chevron and Texaco joint venture 
questioned what they dubbed a ‘rigid system of price fixing by arbitrary 
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formulae’59. Challenging the ECA’s declarations, these companies held that the 
approved rules ran against the very nature of competition in which oil prices 
draw upon differential allowances to enable the supplier to adapt to 
competition, irrespective of its proximity to various markets. Caltex stressed 
that price allocation should always rest with private initiative: ‘the netback 
formula is not a price: a netback is merely a figure which results if the amount 
of freight allowance or other allowances is deduced from the f.o.b. price”60. 
Forced to play the single f.o.b. price matchup and earn its oil-dollars, Caltex 
was a persistent deviant force within the petroleum industry.61. 
 
The Shadow of American Netback Prices  
 
In the second semester of 1948, there were plenty of reasons to hold the line 
on the $2.03/bbl price for Saudi Arabian 36º API: uniform pricing was becoming 
a reality; shipments to Europe were picking up pace; core US multinational 
practices had received validation in the ECA’s own pricing rules; British and 
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British–Dutch oil companies were striving to maintain parallel Iraq and Kuwait 
marketing prices; and, most importantly, ‘US taxpayer dollar’ expenditure was 
now justified by the application of a formula, a rationale and a ceiling price. 
Generally, the Marshall Plan foundations seemed sound and robust. 
Nevertheless, the entire architecture would soon be shattered through its own 
backdoor with the onset of US petroleum imports.  
When the Persian Gulf surplus became large enough to flow into North 
America, a second equalization point surfaced. Middle Eastern crude had to be 
priced at a level that also enabled it to compete on the US East Coast. This 
figure was necessarily below the original North European netback price, which 
drove a new cycle of price asymmetries. Henceforth, all companies stuck to 
the official ECA-financed prices of $2.03, $1.97 and $2.76/bbl for the Arabian, 
Kuwait and Iraq crudes, respectively, which were exported to Europe62. 
However, they simultaneously charged $1.43, $1.30 and $1.75/bbl, 
respectively, for similar shipments, which were accounted for as intra-company 
transactions, directed to the US East Coast.63 As long as these transactions 
were not subject to arm’s length bargaining, they could remain undisclosed and 
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under the seal of commercial secrecy. But keeping such a conspicuous trade 
flow concealed for a long time proved difficult. Oil company declarations to US 
Customs left a track record that could not be erased and, through them, the 
ECA took notice of the shadow prices charged for Middle East exports64. This 
discovery sent shockwaves throughout America. In hindsight, the debate about 
netback prices appeared merely as a cover for overcharging the European aid 
program while the companies pursued a policy of competitive transfer pricing 
in corporate business dealings with the United States. Homeland discontent 
again mounted in many quarters, spearheaded by organizations representing 
independent oil companies. The annual meeting of independent producers 
approved a resolution stating that the ‘… ECA program is subsidizing with 
American taxpayer money a few private concerns permitting them to dump 
surplus oil into America … Information as to the future plans makes it 
increasingly clear that the program threatens to make serious inroads upon the 
domestic petroleum industry’65. Price equalization at European levels backfired 
on price equalization at the US Gulf level, opening up one more front against 
the majors.  
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Forced onto the defensive, the web of organizations woven around Middle East 
oil went to great lengths to justify the current state of affairs: oil companies 
reassured the public that such shipments were sporadic and temporary, only 
‘designed to meet crude shortages in the US’66.  
Walter Levy subscribed to this temporary thesis wrapping it in a sophisticated 
theory of pendulous prices. Middle East petroleum inroads into the U.S. market 
were justified as the result of an abnormal overproduction cycle: according to 
the theory, after demand softened unexpectedly in 1948, the surplus pushed 
for a “low” phase in which the Persian Gulf crude “naturally” reached the more 
distant and higher priced U.S. market. Overall, oil prices tended to fluctuate 
“between a high that will be a price which will just permit Western Hemisphere 
crude oil to be shipped to western Europe and a low which will just permit 
Middle east crude oil to move into the western Hemisphere” 67. We return 
further ahead to this pendulous theory, customized by the Jersey-Exxon and 
Socony explanations68. For the moment, the core point stems from the 
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concomitant appearance of an alternative standpoint inside the ECA that urged 
for an unyielding stance on pricing. This represented a challenge to the pro-
business arguments of Walter Lewis. The opportunity arose in March 1949, 
when the ECA appointed a group of five consultants with the mission of 
determining whether to retain the netback price formula system. 
One of the consultants, George W. Stocking, Dean of Economics at the 
Vanderbilt University, presented the group’s recommendations regarding the 
cessation of the “formula based on European needs of Western Hemisphere 
oil” 69, but moved later far beyond this conclusion to stress the need for a cost 
plus formula and the fairness of the $1.34 /bbl competitive price for 36º API 
crude Ras Tanura 70. The agency’s administration preferred instead to support 
a reach out strategy and search for voluntary price adjustments with the 
companies. 
All endeavours resulted in greater pressure upon the oil majors to close the 
gap between the intra-company transfer prices and the official ECA-financed 
prices71. In February 1949, Paul Hoffman, the agency’s director, advised 
companies that the price charged for Middle East crude oil sales to the United 
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Sates had an important bearing on determining the competitive market price, 
and requested a global re-examination of this issue. The reactions were 
contradictory with Jersey Standard-Exxon and Caltex blatantly refusing any 
decline in the netback price of $2.03/bbl, while Socony-Mobil agreed to think 
the issue over. The unprecedented backing of higher prices by Caltex should 
be understood in the context of the enhanced commercial flexibility, which was 
secured by the company in the meantime. Indeed, this commitment reflected 
the willingness to maintain the equilibrium between the $2.03/bbl official price, 
which was valid for ECA shipments and for Aramco sales, and the shadow 
$1.43/bbl price, which was effective for intra-company transfers. Once the 
double-pricing arrangement was in force, there were no reasons to give up on 
the dollars earmarked for the European assistance program. 
The Gulf Oil attitude was even more surprising. Retracting from parallel pricing, 
Gulf Oil broke with the oligopolistic consent and yielded two price reductions: 
the first was 15 cents in April 1949; the second was 13 cents in July 1949. With 
the downward adjustment of official Kuwait crude 31º API oil prices to 
$1.75/bbl, all majors were compelled to follow suit and pushed the marker for 
crude, Saudi light, to $1.71/bbl. 
Gulf Oil’s historical deviation in pricing best illustrates the prevalence of 
corporate self-interests over collusive practices and invariably stands out as 
the utmost deviant firm, at least in potential terms. In contrast with its other 
‘sisters’, the company explored the fastest growing oilfields in the Middle East, 
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supplied the residual demand for crude and petroleum products in Europe (i.e. 
the available portion of market demand not supplied by other firms in the 
market), and met the core demand for crude in the United States where it 
operated a highly integrated business based on its East Texas oilfields72. For 
these reasons, Gulf Oil would only marginally be affected by any possible 
change in the ECA pricing policy while enjoying the freedom to replace 
European sales for American sales. Although the European markets had only 
a marginal bearing upon Gulf Oil’s overseas exports, they also had more 
transactions with independent refining companies rather than with their own 
affiliates73, and made use of official crude prices rather than transfer prices74. 
The company was ranked as the top Middle East oil exporter to the United 
States at the time, with a 41% share of total crude invoices75. The Kuwait 
concession held by Gulf Oil (in joint partnership with Anglo-Iranian-BP) was not 
held back by any restrictive offtake clause similar to those found in Iraq or Saudi 
Arabia; therefore, the concessionaires were entirely free to lift unlimited 
quantities of crude oil at cost. Similarly, the concentration of the whole 
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exploration operation into the single giant Burgan oilfield enhanced productivity 
and rapid production growth. In every aspect of market heterogeneity, Gulf Oil 
stood out as one of a kind. If the company acted swiftly to break the collusive 
chain, siding conspicuously with the ECA authorities76, this stemmed from its 
willingness to favour further inroads into the US market to absorb the swelling 
Kuwait production without any rebound effect on the profits earned in Europe. 
Additionally, Gulf Oil was quite sensitive to the mood of American political 
circles and public opinion, and was unwilling to jeopardize its US business. 
Because the company was the supplier for the residual demand in the ECA’s 
incumbent European market, it was also positioned to overturn the rules of the 
game and achieve its own ends. 
Ironically, all efforts to objectify a pricing policy by grounding decisions on 
formulas ended up in prices being set by successive calibrations and 
negotiations. From the viewpoint of the authorities, while the $2.03/bbl ceiling 
rested upon a system of logic (the main trade flows to Europe) and a principle 
of equity (netback equalization), the $1.75/bbl Gulf Oil price was simply a ‘token 
reduction’77 imposed by the circumstances. In terms of straightforward norms, 
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the ECA was now back where it had started and had little margin to challenge 
the new plateau for official crude oil prices, which endured until July 1953.78 
The scope for fixing a global and interconnected price for crude was partially 
misunderstood by contemporary oilmen. The anchor of the world system, the 
Texas–Caribbean price, proved deeply stable after 1948. In contrast, freight 
tanker rates imparted growing volatility to the final prices. This was something 
both new and unexpected because standard fixed rates had remained the 
norm for over a decade. During World War II, governments had been 
compelled to requisition tankers from the major private oil companies, 
conceiving a uniform system based upon equal treatment: after allowing for 
port costs, bunker costs and canal expenses, the net daily revenue was the 
same for all voyages regardless of departure and destination79. These tanker 
voyage schedules remained in effect until 1948. The rate was identified by the 
issuing institution acronyms: USMC represented the rates published under the 
United States Maritime Commission authority; MOT represented the rates 
published by the British Ministry of Transport. 
When government shipping controls ended, an effervescent market developed 
and the trade soon evolved towards negotiated shipping prices, in terms of 
USMC or MOT, plus or minus a percentage dictated by supply and demand. A 
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specialized information business service soon flourished to report current 
USMC and MOT market rates for tanker charters along with the number of 
fixtures, inquiries for prompt vessels placed by oil companies, tonnage in 
demand and general shipping information: Lincoln Ship Brokerage, Ocean 
Freight and Brokerage Corporation, SA Long Incorporated or Platt’s Oilgram 
provided the most reputable weekly bulletins. However, this was only the tip of 
the iceberg. 
In contrast with the reports on independent charter vessels, the bulk of 
deadweight trade was undertaken by company-controlled oil tankers and did 
not enter the public domain. Under such circumstances, the calculus of netback 
prices continually raised disputes about the accuracy of the USMC rate 
selected80. Moreover, owing to the different distances to Europe and the US, 
FOB Middle East prices tended to fluctuate inversely with tanker rates: the 
higher the tanker rates, the lower the netback price at the shipping port.  
To ascertain whether the Eastern and Western hemisphere prices were 
connected or cut off by the course of events, Figure 1 shows three time-series: 
(i) the official price of Arabian crude; (ii) the price at which Arabian crude 
equalized Venezuelan competition in Northern Europe; and (iii) the price suited 
to equalize US-Texas crude on the New York market. The greater the 
convergence among the three lines in the graph, the greater the 
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synchronization of the global pricing system. The estimates draw upon archival 
data sources from the Caltex Oil Tanker Company, which depicts the lowest 
haulage freights among the arm’s-length subsidiaries81. Similarly, these figures 
are closer to ECA assessments82. 
                                                                                                                                  
 
                                                                                                                                    
Figure 1 
Arabian crude oil: official prices, netback price in Northern Europe and 
netback prices on the New York market (January 1948 to May 1952) 
according to Caltex freight rates. 
 
Sources Figure 1: Platt’s Oil Handbook 1947-1953, Platt, New York; Petroleum Press Service 1949-
1953; Bremer Jahrbuch der Weltschiffahrt Bremen World Shipping Yearbook 1952/53 1954/55, 
Springer-Verlag Berlin; Caltex Freight Rates, Jersey Freight Rates, The National Archives - 
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Washington, Record of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Arab Oil Litigation #43, Freight 
Documents. 
The consecutive overlapping of the dotted and the solid lines conclusively 
proves that both the Jersey Standard-Exxon endorsement of $2.03/bbl and the 
Gulf Oil endorsement of $1.75/bbl were almost perfect matches with North 
Europe and North America netbacks through to the last quarter of 1950 at least. 
The ECA’s doubts regarding meaningless prices, which were arrived at by ad-
hoc adjustments (e.g. Gulf Oil’s voluntary price cuts), were thus ill-founded. 
The critical juncture of April–July 1949 was a turning point in the history of the 
world’s prices because it shifted the point of equalization from North Europe to 
the East Coast of the United States. Indeed, given the potential oil reserves in 
the Persian Gulf, April–July 1949 constituted the breakthrough moment when 
the Middle East became the central axis of the world petroleum economy. With 
the official price at $1.75/bbl, Middle East producers could beat—or at least 
equal—the competition everywhere. When prices were aligned by the US 
netback, a new yardstick ultimately emerged. To the best of our knowledge, 
Paul Frankel, a petroleum economist and consultant, had the foresight to see 
what was coming. In 1948, Frankel predicted that with exports to the US ‘the 
tendency for only one FOB price level to be effective to all destinations would 
be inevitable’83. 
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The above conclusions are based upon efficient tanker freight rates. However, 
the hypothesis can be tested more accurately. Figure 2 represents the same 
data but uses a weighted average for the tanker rates. Three groups are 
considered: Caltex and Royal Dutch-Shell rates returned the most efficient 
haulage charges; Jersey Standard-Exxon freight rates were taken as indicative 
of less efficient company-controlled transportation fleets, while the average 
prices published annually by Platt’s Oil Handbook provided a thorough account 
of the third group of independent long-term charters (i.e. non-company 
controlled shipping services that constituted a type of spot market for petroleum 
transportation). Because Platt’s data were gathered from ship brokers and tank 
steamer chartering agents, they comprised only on-the-spot transactions 
undertaken by decentralized agents and tanker terminal operators84. Lastly, the 
statistical information available on the number of ships in each of these groups 
was compiled from different sources85, and the weights for the Caltex index, 
the Jersey index and the long-term charter index were made proportional to 
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their total number of ships, which were measured in equivalent standard T2 
tankers with 12,000 tons deadweight. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Arabian crude oil: official prices, netback price in Northern Europe and 
netback price in the New York market (January 1948 to May 1952) using 
weighted average freight rates. 
 
Sources Figure 2: Platt’s Oil Handbook 1947-1953, Platt, New York; Petroleum Press Service 1949-
1953; Bremer Jahrbuch der Weltschiffahrt Bremen World Shipping Yearbook 1952/53 1954/55, 
Springer-Verlag Berlin; Caltex Freight Rates, Jersey Freight Rates, The National Archives - 
Washington, Record of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Arab Oil Litigation #43, Freight 
Documents. 
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Overall, Figure 2 corroborates the conclusions drawn so far concerning the 
effective matching of ECA official prices with netback estimates, the turn 
towards New York equalization and the momentous nature of the $1.75/bbl 
crude price adjustment. The contrast between the two graphs was obvious in 
the collapse of netback prices by the close of 1950, which was caused by the 
spike in tanker freight rates86. After this shortage, the shipbuilding industry 
witnessed a building boom that paved the way for the first generation of super-
tankers87. As mentioned earlier, one of the consequences of the inverse 
relationship between tanker rates and netback prices (the higher the tanker 
rates, the lower the netback price at the shipping port) was the contraction in 
the geographical penetration of Middle East crudes. This narrowed its 
competitive range to Mediterranean and Indian Ocean ports where high 
transport costs still could be more easily accommodated. As Figure 2 applies 
a weighted average that also accounts for less efficient tankers, Middle East 
crude oil was then arriving onto the New York market with a much higher 
customs insurance freight (c.i.f.) price. Within this framework, the equalization 
of US crude sank the Persian Gulf prices at their origins to such an extent that 
exports to the Western hemisphere completely lost their competitive edge.  
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In conclusion, periods of record freight rates associated with wide uncertainty 
tended to narrow the market inroads of the Middle East crudes. It was this 
turbulent ‘shipping market cycle,’88 rather than the pendular motion between 
low and high crude prices, that ended up determining the market range for 
Persian Gulf petroleum. 
 
Core Cartel and Deviant Firms  
 
The collapse of the Gulf-plus system, combined with outstanding discoveries 
of new reservoirs across the Arabic Peninsula and Persia, awoke latent 
competitive forces within the oligopolistic oil economy. After World War II, 
business differences regarding global vertical integration, market priorities and 
Western–Eastern hemisphere competition heightened the fracture between 
the ‘historical core’ cartel (Jersey Standard-Exxon and Royal Dutch-Shell), 
which had diversified investments in supply around the world and thus an 
interest in pursuing a global pricing strategy, and the group of ‘fringe’ or 
‘latecomer’ companies (Texaco, Standard of California-Chevron [grouped into 
Caltex] and Gulf Oil). These latter companies upheld the pricing strategies 
centred on the Middle East production, where most of their export surplus was 
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located. As a result of successive deviations from dominant collusive 
behaviour, a new price system surfaced. The first breach came with Caltex’s 
opposition to a global standard, which was grounded on the usage of netback 
formulas. The netback method hindered competition because it envisaged the 
equalization of Arabian crude prices in Europe with the prices from Western 
hemisphere exports, especially Venezuela and the US, where core companies 
held their grip. To loosen the Gulf of Mexico straitjacket, Caltex insisted on a 
‘cost-plus’ formula, which provided for a low, competitive price for Arabian 
crude, and thus expanded the independent Eastern hemisphere market. The 
fringe company represented the newcomer’s perspective, which favoured 
competitive prices set at the origin rather than at the destination, with regional, 
non-uniform ranges rendered flexible through variable allowances. Ultimately, 
the crude pricing controversy ended up with the creation of a double-pricing 
system, based on the official or posted price, and a lower private transfer price 
set between the shareholding company and their affiliates.  
Next, the Gulf-Oil Copernican revolution displaced netback prices from their 
European equalization axis towards the gravity force of the US market. As 
mentioned earlier, this was the breakthrough moment when the Middle East 
became the keystone of the world petroleum economy, beating the competition 
at destinations all around the world. Therefore, the official $1.75/bbl price 
stands as a historical landmark. Certainly, the fact that Caltex was the major 
Middle East exporter to Europe (and was the ECA supplier), while Gulf Oil was 
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the major supplier to the United States, were powerful incentives for their 
misalignments. 
A global oil pricing system briefly emerged from this chain of events, interlinking 
Middle East production centres in the Eastern hemisphere with the American 
and Caribbean oilfields in the Western hemisphere. Under stable freight tanker 
rates, this system ensured the global competitiveness of the Persian Gulf 
petroleum area. 
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